This paper presents experimental evidence demonstrating that agents' knowledge of strategy alternatives in pure coordination games is inversely correlated with decision-making efficacy. Alternative theoretical accounts of players' choice processes in coordination games are considered to shed light on our empirical results.
Introduction
According to conventional economic wisdom, information promotes the efficacy of individual decision making and the efficiency of resource allocation generally. However, exceptions have been uncovered both in theoretical and empirical work on strategic as well as parametric decision making. Kreps et al. (1982) demonstrate that certain types of incomplete information can generate cooperation in the finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma. Camerer et al. (1989) report a "curse of knowledge" in market experiments where agents systematically fail to exploit private information. Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999) show how a subject's lack of information affords recourse to choice heuristics that systematically outperform the decision making of better-informed subjects. In the present paper, we discuss how an additional manifestation of this type of effect may arise in the pure coordination game and present experimental evidence for it. Section 2 provides an overview of the theoretical background. The experimental design is outlined in section 3. Section 4 reports the results. A discussion of the findings is offered in section 5. We conclude in section 6.
Salience and Coordination
In coordination games, agents receive payoffs for selecting strategies that match those their opponents are choosing concurrently. While purely rational deliberation in this type of game generates an infinite regress of mutual out-guessing, it has been shown that experimental players can often coordinate surprisingly well (Schelling, 1960; Mehta et al., 1994b,a; Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997) . A number of mechanisms of coordination have been proposed in the theoretical literature, including the presence of Pareto (or payoff) dominance among multiple equilibria (Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , but see Van Huyck et al. (1990) ; Cooper et al. (1990 Cooper et al. ( , 1992 ), pre-play communication (Cooper et al., 1994) and learning processes in repeated games (Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993) .
Other writers have attempted to tackle the one-shot, non-cooperative, 'pure' version of the coordination or 'matching' game without payoff dominance (see table 1 ). According to Schelling's (1960) seminal analysis, games of this sort can be resolved to the extent that certain alternatives are conspicuous or salient (Gauthier, 1975) and therefore provide focal points for coordination. Subsequent writers have sought to formalise this idea by examining how players use imagination to differentiate between alternative strategies on the basis of salience, and logic to select on the basis of the distinction made (Gauthier, 1975; Lewis, 1969; Mehta et al., 1994b; Sugden, 1995; Casajus, 2000; Janssen, 2001) .
1 We concentrate here on the account proposed by Bacharach (Bacharach, 1993; Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997) . In it, agents describe and differentiate alternatives on the basis of one or more of their attributes that are available to them, i.e. are observed. Availability is defined as the probability that a certain attribute is noticed. For instance, agents may notice the colour, shape or size of objects which constitute the coordination choice problem. To maximise expected utility, agents select that object conspicuous by possessing the rarest attribute (e.g. being the only red object) in order to maximise expected value. In cases with equal rarity, agents opt for the object with the more available, easily noticed rare attribute. As a result, an alternative is salient to the extent that it possesses rare attributes, and that its attributes are highly available. In certain cases, the optimal choice may result from a trade-off of rarity and availability.
This account considers closed-format, complete information coordination games in the sense that players are presented with the commonly-known decision alternatives. However, a type of information incompleteness arises as a result of imperfect availability. The fewer attributes of actions a decision maker notices, the fewer options result from the agent's description of them. To the extent that information completeness may be interpreted here as knowledge of or expertise in the problem domain, it is natural to ask what the effect of increasing availability, or information completeness, on decision efficacy is. In one sense, greater information complicates the coordination problem by generating more choice options. In addition, ceteris paribus, the congruence of the agent's option set with that of the other player is reduced. As a result, in games where no alternative has a unique and available attribute, the probability of a match will be lower. As an illustration, consider a matching game where players decide between marbles of different colours. The addition of a blue marble to a white, a red and a green marble complicates the coordination problem. The addition of a white to two whites and a red does not. We may therefore suspect that incomplete information may be positively related with coordination in games without a single salient option.
Similar considerations apply to arguably more realistic open-format coordination games as described by both Schelling (1960) and Sugden (1995) , where players are not presented with a list of admissible alternatives ('select a location in New York City to meet', 'name any mountain'). In these games, all players have some degree of incomplete information as to the set of admissible choices. In the following, we discuss open-format matching games to test the relationship between knowledge of strategy alternatives and decision making efficacy using an experiment designed for this purpose. Open-format games afford a convenient way of measuring agents' degrees of incomplete information about decision alternatives using post-play questionnaires, which can then be related to their ability to coordinate in the game.
Experimental Design
We consider a one-shot pure coordination game where there are n players and T possible strategies for each player under complete information. Under incomplete information, a player j chooses among i j strategies (where 2 < i j < T ) from an 'effective' set S j = {s j1 , ...s jij }. The set I = {i 1 , ...i n } therefore represents players' incomplete knowledge concerning the T possible strategies. A player j receives a payoff u j = U > 0 if the chosen strategy d j is the same as that chosen by their opponent, i.e. d j = d −j ; otherwise the player wins nothing. This game has multiple pure Nash equilibria which Pareto-dominate all non-equilibrium outcomes and between which all players are indifferent. An example of such a game is given in table 1.
The relationship between information and coordination in games of this type was tested in a subject group of n = 43 MBA students across five problem categories, (1) U.S. Presidents since 1900, (2) plays by William Shakespeare, (3) European national capitals, (4) current English F.A. Premier League football teams, and (5) car manufacturing brands of European origin. These categories were selected to be (idenifiably) finite in membership and non-trivial in difficulty to permit both variation in and measurement of the two variables in our mainly South-East Asian subject group.
Player 2 s 21 s 22 Player 1 s 11 3, 3 0, 0 s 12 0, 0 3, 3 Table 1 : A pure coordination game in strategic form with n = 2, i 1 = i 2 = 2 and U = 3.
The experiment consisted of a coordination and an information part. In the former, subjects were randomly and anonymously paired and asked to name a valid category member to match that given simultaneously by their anonymous opponents. The question was repeated for each of the categories. After the completion of the coordination part, subjects were incentivized to provide as many valid members of the categories as possible.A no-communication setting was strictly enforced.
2 The payoffs were Ringgit Malaysia (RM) 3 for each coordination game match and RM 0.15 for each valid member respectively 3 . Our subjects' opportunity cost of taking part in the experiment was low as it was conducted during a scheduled class period.
Experimental Results
The results for the coordination part are displayed in table 2. We proxy an individual's coordination for each of the games by the expected value (EV) of the chosen strategy. Following the notation used in Mehta et al. (1994b) , let N be the number of subjects, n the number of valid responses given within the subject group, and m 1 , ..., m k the distribution of valid subject answers over the k distinct responses recorded in the group for a particular question such that n = k h=1 (m h ). We say that
For each of our categories, we also report the degree of coordination in the subject group as a whole. Such a measure should capture several dimensions, including the number of distinct strategies selected within the group and the number of subjects selecting each respectively. There are theoretical difficulties in designing a measure capturing all relevant elements.
5 Here, we report the (23) United (25) 2 Clinton (17) Macbeth (7) Paris (17) Liverpool (8) Mercedes (10) 3 Kennedy (5) Hamlet (3) Budapest (1) Arsenal (4) Volvo (4) 4 Carter (1) The Merchant Helsinki (1) Bolton (1) Audi (2) of Venice (1) 5 Johnson (1) Othello (1) Peugeot (2) 6 Reagan (1) The Table 2 : Subjects' coordination across the five categories. Values for m k are given in brackets. The number of non-valid responses are given as N − n.
group coordination measure for pairwise coordination games proposed by Mehta et al. (1994a) as
The information part of the experiment generated the results presented in table 4. Subjects' knowledge of the T possible strategies as expressed by the size of their effective strategy sets S j . We measure this as the total number of valid answers each subject provided for a given knowledge question over the total of all possible valid answers (i j /T ). This calculation generates a proxy for our information index I.
Finally, adapting the concept of availability in Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) for our purposes, we measured how well-known particular strategy alternatives are as W the number of experimental subjects that were able to name them in the information part of the experiment. This data for all our categories is given in tables 5, 6,7, 8 and 9 respectively. We then constructed an index W (d j ) to denote the 'well-knownness' of each subject's chosen strategy.
6
We start by describing the results. First, the degree of coordination c across mathematical correspondence between market concentration and group coordination c as both constitute frequency distributions over a variable number of categories. We can use the HKI to measure convergence of subjects' answers. In particular, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, Hirschman (1964) ), a special case of the HKI with α = 2. As alternative powers generate different results, the choice of power is discretionary. Hannah and Kay (1977) argue for α between 0.6 and 2.5 depending on the features of the industry concerned. As we use group coordination indices for illustration rather than statistical testing, we do not explore the results of alternative powers here. A similar objection would apply to the measure c as used in Mehta et al. (1994a) .
6 Although this term is somewhat awkward, potential synonyms such as prominence, renown or fame have (positive) connotations we are trying to avoid. all categories was generally comparable to results for similar games reported by Mehta et al. (1994b) . 7 Despite the large number of decision alternatives (between 19 and 49), subjects were able to achieve some degree of coordination. In particular, the most common choice in all categories was also the strategy with the highest W (Romeo and Juliet, London and Manchester United respectively). We may speculate that most subjects selected the option "choose the most well-known alternative". This hypothesis is supported by the high correlation between the expected value EV (d j ) and the well-knownness W (d j ) of chosen alternatives across all categories and subjects (see column 2 in table 3). Similar findings were reported by Mehta et al. (1994a) with respect to 'name a mountain', where 89% of respondents chose Mount Everest.
The experiment was designed to test the hypothesis of an inverse relationship between the expected value of a player's chosen strategy EV (d j ) and i j the number of elements in that player's strategy set. We analysed the relationship between the two variables using Pearson correlation coefficients, which are given in table 3. The correlation is confimed as negative for all categories, however significant at 10% only for Shakespeare plays and F.A. clubs.
Finally, column 4 in table 3 reports the correlations between the well-knownness of chosen strategy alternatives (W (d j )) and the degree of incomplete information (i j ) for all subjects in all categories. The negative coefficients again indicate a greater tendency for less-informed subjects to choose the more wellknown alternatives. This finding is significant at 10% or less for all categories but Shakespeare plays and European capitals.
Discussion
In our experiments, better-informed subjects were systematically less likely to select the most well-known alternative and scored lower payoffs as a result. What explains the decision making of these subjects? We may suspect that they were either (1) less likely to use W as a choice criterion, (2) more motivated by non-rational choice criteria, or (3) less able to differentiate alternatives by this criterion. The first of these is intuitively implausible. We can think of no reason to suspect an inverse link between information about strategy alternatives and general coordination competence. The second explanation invokes expressively-rational decision making (Hargreaves-Heap, 1989) . Greater knowledge may indicate greater personal interest in the problem domain and lead to choices which pursue self-expression rather than maximal payoffs. An example is a football fan who selects her own rather than the most well-known team in our clubs category. The third explanation revolves around the apparent use of a "choose the most well-known alternative" heuristic by the majority of our subjects. We explore this explanation in the following by considering first why such a heuristic was widely used in our experiment, and secondly, why better-informed subjects made less use of it.
The first issue concerns the use of well-knownness of strategy alternatives as the key to coordination in our experiments.
8 As we have seen, there is some agreement that agents solve coordination problems by differentiating strategy alternatives by their characteristics. In our matching game, well-knownness provides a source of rarity and availability as a result of incomplete information. Our subjects' lacking knowledge generates a conspicuous distinction of alternatives on the basis of how well known they were. In contrast, such a distinction cannot be made in games with complete information.
9
This account of choice in the incomplete information matching game provides a potential explanation of our experimental results. The identification of the best-known alternative is based on an estimation of how well-known alternatives are generally among the subject group. There is evidence that problems of this type are often solved using an availability heuristic, 10 in that agents estimate "the frequency of a class or the probability of an event ... by the ease with which instances or associations could be brought to mind" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982, p.164) . However, this heuristic may generate errors to the extent that items may come to mind not only because they are common, but due 8 Superficially, this result may seem tautological to the extent that to be well-known is treated synonymously with being salient. In this sense, our finding would describe, rather than explain the role of salience in coordination. However, this objection is based on a misunderstanding of salience, which refers to uniquely possessing some conspicuous attribute (Lewis, 1969; Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997; Casajus, 2000) . Being the most well-known makes an option conspicuous, but alternative options may possess rival sources of conspicuousness.
9 It may be objected that 'second most well-known' also possesses uniqueness and may serve as an alternative choice criterion. According to Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) , the attribute 'best-known' would presumably have higher availability. In a similar vein, Sugden (1995) argues that many frequency distributions (such as firm size, word repetition in books etc) are skewed such that the most common class is n times more common than the n th most common (e.g. Ijiri and Simon (1977) ). Sugden demonstrates that under these conditions, expected utility maximisation is associated with choosing the most common alternative. Sugden's account can be seen to work analogously to rarity and availability in Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) .
10 Note that the term availability has different meanings in Tversky and Kahneman (1982) and Bacharach (1993) Table 4 : Selected statistics on subject information across the five categories.
to emotional involvement, recency, vividness and similar factors. As a result, better-informed subjects may have a disadvantage when their greater knowledge and/or involvement in the problem domain may cause alternatives to come to their minds which are not generally the most well-known. In a sense, greater familiarity may obscure which options are well-known to non-experts.
11

Conclusion
In order to solve coordination problems, agents differentiate strategy alternatives on the basis of their attributes. In incomplete-information coordination games, suitable such distinctions can be made on the basis of how well known the respective alternatives are among the group of players. Incomplete information appears to better enable players to identify this attribute. We conclude that there is some evidence for a "curse of knowledge" of strategy alternatives in coordination games. To our knowledge, this is the first time such an effect has been demonstrated. Table 9 : The well-knownness of strategy alternatives for European car brands measured as the total number of mentions by subjects in the information part of the experiment.
